Let\u27s Keep It Civil: An Evaluation of Civil Disabilities, a Call for Reform, and Recommendations to Reduce Recidivism by Pinedo, Victor J.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 102
Issue 2 January 2017 Article 5
Let's Keep It Civil: An Evaluation of Civil
Disabilities, a Call for Reform, and
Recommendations to Reduce Recidivism
Victor J. Pinedo
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Victor J. Pinedo, Let's Keep It Civil: An Evaluation of Civil Disabilities, a Call for Reform, and Recommendations to Reduce Recidivism,
102 Cornell L. Rev. 513 (2017)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol102/iss2/5
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-2\CRN205.txt unknown Seq: 1 17-JAN-17 13:03
NOTE
LET’S KEEP IT CIVIL: AN EVALUATION OF
CIVIL DISABILITIES, A CALL FOR REFORM,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
REDUCE RECIDIVISM
Victor J. Pinedo†
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514 R
I. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517 R
A. From Civil Death to Civil Disabilities . . . . . . . . . . 517 R
B. What Is Punishment?  Establishing the
Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520 R
1. General Definitions of Punishment . . . . . . . . . 520 R
2. How We Will Define Punishment . . . . . . . . . . . 522 R
II. CIVIL DISABILITIES: PUNISHMENT OR CONSEQUENCE? . . . 523 R
A. Civil Disabilities as Non-Punitive
Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524 R
B. Civil Disabilities as Punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 526 R
C. Why the Punitive Conceptualization Works . . . . 528 R
D. Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 529 R
III. THE JUSTIFICATION AND NARROWING OF CIVIL
DISABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530 R
A. Can Civil Disabilities Be Justified? . . . . . . . . . . . . 530 R
B. The Narrowly Tailored Standard: A Cost-
Benefit and Constitutional Justification . . . . . . . 532 R
1. A Constitutional Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 532 R
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534 R
IV. SHAPING OUR POLICIES AND REDUCING RECIDIVISM . . . . 535 R
† Washington University in St. Louis, B.S.B.A. Marketing & Psychology,
2013; Cornell Law School, J.D. candidate, 2017; Managing Editor, Cornell Law
Review, Volume 102.  I am forever indebted to my parents, Victor and Magaly
Pinedo, for their continued support and encouragement.  Without your guidance
and love throughout my life, I would not be where I am today.  A sincere thank you
to Professor Stephen Garvey for sparking my academic interest in the subject
matter of this Note and serving as an invaluable resource for support and gui-
dance throughout the Note writing process.  Last but certainly not least, many
thanks to the members of the Cornell Law Review and Amelia Hritz, Sue Pado,
William Pellett, Adam McCall, Preston Bruno, Nicole Greenstein, Emmanuel Hi-
ram Arnaud, and Christina Lee for their invaluable editing, support, advice, and
feedback throughout the various stages of writing and editing this Note.  The
opinions expressed herein are those of the author.
513
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-2\CRN205.txt unknown Seq: 2 17-JAN-17 13:03
514 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:513
A. Fostering Reintegration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 536 R
1. Remove Public Housing Bans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 536 R
2. Remove Bans on Education Funding . . . . . . . 537 R
B. Criminal Records and Narrow Tailoring . . . . . . . 539 R
1. Criminal Records as De Facto Civil
Disabilities and Their Usage in Employment
Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539 R
2. A Direct Application: Ban the Box and
Selective Background Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541 R
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544 R
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: You have just been re-
leased from prison after serving a two-year sentence for sale of
a controlled substance.  Upon release, you search for housing
in your community but learn that your conviction disqualifies
you from public housing.1  You look for a job, but given the
restrictions and required disclosures, your search constantly
leads to dead ends.2  You decide to pursue a college education,
but learn that you only qualify for a limited amount of federal
aid and cannot receive Federal Pell Grants—loans that do not
require repayment.3  Fed up with your situation, you turn to
the ballot box but learn that you have lost your right to vote.4
Facing these bleak circumstances, you turn back to selling
drugs and are re-arrested.  This cycle is one that far too many
in this country face each year.
For ex-offenders, the odds are stacked against them to
recidivate and return to prison.5  A recent Department of Jus-
tice study revealed that among 404,638 released state prison-
1 24 C.F.R. § 960.204 (2015).
2 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.160 (West 2010) (permitting employers to
request conviction records for any felony offense and for certain misdemeanors);
MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.9.1406(2)(h) (2016) (permitting employers to inquire about
criminal convictions).
3 34 C.F.R. § 668.40 (2015) (denying federal aid to individuals with certain
drug convictions); 34 C.F.R. § 690.2 (2015) (defining student eligibility for the
federal Pell Grant Program).
4 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 97.041(2)(b) (2002) (explaining that those with felony
convictions must have their rights restored by the state after their release from
prison).
5 See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010, at 1 (2014);
Stephanie Slifer, Once a Criminal, Always a Criminal?, CBS NEWS (Apr. 23, 2014,
7:35 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/once-a-criminal-always-a-criminal/
[https://perma.cc/M22Y-ND2W] (breaking down the Bureau of Justice Statistics’
report into different types of offenses and their respective recidivism rates).
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ers in 2005, 67.8% were re-arrested within three years.6  These
trends have not gone unnoticed, with many state governments
focusing on improved reentry procedures and reduced recidi-
vism rates as a “cornerstone[ ]” of their crime policy.7  Even the
federal government has taken initiatives to curtail these high
rates.8  Indeed, such a concern makes sense.  During a time
where mass-incarceration has markedly increased, re-incar-
ceration accounts for a significant percentage of all incarcera-
tions.9  Moreover, these recidivism rates reflect poorly on the
state’s correctional system.10  Among the multitude of chal-
lenges that prisoners face upon reentry, one is particularly
crippling—civil disabilities.
Civil disabilities, also known as collateral consequences,
are consequences that both federal and state governments im-
pose on ex-offenders upon their release from prison.11  For ex-
ample, a re-entering prisoner in New York can lose the right to
vote,12 and a convicted drug felon in the United States can lose
access to both Medicare and state healthcare programs.13  In
addition, an ex-offender may lose access to welfare benefits,
public housing, and employment opportunities.14  Under-
standably, such outcomes can make punishment seem never
ending to the ex-offender.15  To further complicate matters,
6 DUROSE ET AL., supra note 5 (analyzing data from thirty states). R
7 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., REDUCING RECIDIVISM: STATES DELIVER
RESULTS 1 (2014) (providing percent changes in recidivism rates in release cohorts
of eight states).
8 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-483, PRISONER RELEASES: TRENDS
AND INFORMATION ON REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS 3, 27 (2001) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]
(noting a sevenfold increase in the number of offenders reincarcerated for violat-
ing parole or release conditions and evaluating a federal grant program intended
to promote successful reentry among young offenders).
9 See REBECCA VALLAS & SHARON DIETRICH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, ONE STRIKE
AND YOU’RE OUT 4 (2014) (noting that the number of Americans currently incarcer-
ated—1.5 million—has “quintupled” since 1980); GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at R
7–8 (“After being released, many individuals—about 40 percent historically—later
are sent back to prison for committing new offenses or violating conditions of
release.”).
10 See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF
AMERICA’S PRISONS 6 (2011) [hereinafter PEW CENTER] (“[M]any states are taking a
hard look at their recidivism rate as a key indicator of the return they receive from
their correctional investments.”).
11 See Zachary Hoskins, Collateral Restrictions, in THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF
CRIMINAL LAW 249 (Chad Flanders & Zachary Hoskins eds., 2016).
12 OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATT’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF
CONVICTED FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY 99 (1996).
13 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2012).
14 Hoskins, supra note 11, at 249. R
15 The lasting nature of criminal convictions makes it extremely difficult for
ex-offenders to distance themselves from their past; this in turn compounds the
effects of civil disabilities. See generally Stephanie Clifford, From the Bench, a
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civil disabilities are not just limited to felonies—they also apply
to misdemeanors.16  The impact of civil disabilities is so tre-
mendous that some states have begun reducing the total num-
ber they impose on ex-offenders.17
Given the harsh burdens that these civil disabilities create,
as well as their potential links to recidivism, one must ask the
following questions: Are civil disabilities best understood as
mere preventative consequences or as a form of punishment?
Moreover, can civil disabilities be justified?  By answering these
questions, this Note will explore the historical background, op-
timal conceptualizations, and current justifications for civil
disabilities.  Ultimately, my goal is to set forth a renewed foun-
dational conceptualization for lawmakers and to demonstrate
the need to adopt narrowly tailored civil disabilities similar to
the standards set forth by the American Bar Association’s
(ABA) Criminal Justice Standards.18  Using this framework, I
will set forth a solution that both state and federal governments
can implement to improve reentry initiatives and reduce recidi-
vism.  Moreover, I will apply this narrow tailoring framework in
the context of criminal records usage, which I conclude func-
tions as a de facto civil disability.
The Note will proceed in four parts.  Part I of this Note will
provide a background on the history of civil disabilities.  This
background will further survey the different definitions of pun-
ishment, ultimately setting forth a more complete and inclusive
definition.  Part II will explore the competing conceptualiza-
New Look at Punishment, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/08/27/nyregion/from-the-bench-a-new-look-at-punishment.html [https:/
/perma.cc/ZH65-KVXR] (“Federal district courts review dozens of similar re-
quests a month . . . .  Most judges have a standard response: Courts can expunge
convictions only in exceptional circumstances.”).
16 Alex Tway & Jonathan Gitlen, An End to the Mystery, A New Beginning for
the Debate: National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction (NICCC)
Provides Complete List of Every Collateral Consequence in Country, CRIM. L. PRAC.,
Summer 2015, at 15, 19 (noting that any misdemeanor will expose felons to 8,743
collateral consequences).
17 See, e.g., Ari Berman, Kentucky Restores Voting Rights for Thousands of Ex-
Felons, NATION (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/kentucky-re
stores-voting-rights-for-thousands-of-ex-felons [https://perma.cc/X2LU-6GSG]
(describing Kentucky’s decision to restore voting rights to ex-offenders); Lauren-
Brooke Eisen, Ohio Takes Step to Roll Back Collateral Consequences, VERA INST.
JUST.: CURRENT THINKING BLOG (Aug. 20, 2012), https://www.vera.org/blog/ohio-
takes-step-to-roll-back-collateral-consequences [https://perma.cc/EVJ7-TNMD]
(describing civil disability reduction initiatives that Ohio has undertaken to re-
duce recidivism rates in the state).
18 AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS
AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (3d ed. 2004) [hereinaf-
ter ABA].
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tions of civil disabilities and will argue that civil disabilities,
despite their historical treatment as a nonpunitive regulation,
are best conceptualized as punishments.  Part III will then set
forth a normative analysis by examining civil disabilities under
several theories of punishment to justify their use as punish-
ment.  Part III will further argue through constitutional and
cost-benefit analyses that, notwithstanding any general justifi-
cation, these civil disabilities must nevertheless be narrowly
tailored.  Based on this conclusion, Part IV will argue for the
removal of insufficiently tailored civil disabilities to reduce re-
cidivism rates throughout the country.  Part IV will also explore
this narrow tailoring framework in the context of the Ban the
Box movement and propose a novel policy recommendation in
response.
I
BACKGROUND
A. From Civil Death to Civil Disabilities
Civil disabilities find their roots in the concept of civil
death, with early English colonists bringing the remnants of
civil death to the colonies and imposing these consequences on
lawbreakers in the community.19  Originating from medieval
justice systems, scholars have defined civil death as a “condi-
tion in which a convicted offender loses all political, civil, and
legal rights.”20  The underlying effect of such a stringent depri-
vation of rights was that the offender’s “membership in society,
as conceived at the time, was over.”21
Under a scheme of civil death, lawbreakers lost the right to
vote, enter contracts, and inherit or bequeath property.22
Though not nearly as crippling as civil death, civil disabilities in
the United States retained several of the incapacitating quali-
ties of civil death.  Until the 1960s, civil disabilities in the
United States included, among other restrictions, the loss of
rights to contract, litigate, and hold various licenses.23
19 Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral
Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214 (2010).
20 Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disen-
franchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1049 n.13 (2002).
21 Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 154 (1999)
(noting that “[t]he ex-offender was treated as if already dead”).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 155.  Although civil death, in its pure form, does not exist in the
United States today, several critics have noted that there are “theoretical similari-
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The strict regime of civil death-like statues in the United
States, however, fell out of favor midway through the twentieth
century.24  During this time, the harsh, condemnation-driven
basis of civil death statutes ultimately gave way to a new goal of
punishment: rehabilitation.25  The basis of this new regime was
to reform offenders and to allow them to lead productive, law-
abiding lives.26  Scholars during this time were aware of the
detrimental effects of civil disabilities and in turn were vocal in
their support for reducing the number of state-imposed civil
disabilities.27  Some scholars even went so far as to proclaim
that civil disabilities were the “causative factor in the social
degradation of the ex-convict.”28
The impetus for civil-death reformation emerged in 1956
during the National Conference on Parole (NCP).29  Here, the
NCP recommended abolishing civil disabilities because of the
significant legal burdens that they imposed on ex-offenders.30
Several years later, in 1962, the American Law Institute’s
Model Penal Code (MPC) proposed a “nuanced way” of restoring
rights and status to ex-offenders.31  This proposed MPC provi-
sion, § 306.6, would allow sentencing courts to enter orders
relieving “any disqualification or disability imposed by law be-
cause of the [ex-offender’s] conviction.”32  Moreover, after a pe-
riod of good behavior by the ex-offender after release, the court
could issue an order vacating the judgment of conviction.33
With the release of the ex-offender, the new goal was to assist
ties between medieval punishments and the collateral consequences of conviction
in the United States . . . .”  Ewald, supra note 20, at 1060–61. R
24 See, e.g., Legislation, Civil Death Statutes—Medieval Fiction in a Modern
World, 50 HARV. L. REV. 968, 977 (1937) (noting that the “continued existence of
civil death, outworn as a mode of punishment and ineffective as a deterrent to
crime, leads to increasing confusion and uncertainty in its effect on the personal
and property relationships of life convicts” and that “it would be wiser to repeal
the civil death statutes”); Pinard, supra note 19, at 1216–17. R
25 See Pinard, supra note 19, at 1216–17. R
26 Id. at 1216.
27 See, e.g., Neil P. Cohen & Dean Hill Rivkin, Civil Disabilities: The Forgotten
Punishment, 35 FED. PROB. 19, 25 (1971) (“To the extent that civil disabilities
impede this progress, they must be reassessed and revamped to conform to mod-
ern theories and methods.”).
28 Id.
29 Pinard, supra note 19, at 1217. R
30 See id.  In their place, the Conference recommended laws that would ex-
punge the record of conviction so that “the individual shall be deemed not to have
been convicted.”  Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In
Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705,
1708 (2003) (internal quotations omitted).
31 Love, supra note 30, at 1711. R
32 MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6(1) (2003).
33 Love, supra note 30, at 1711. R
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the ex-offender’s reintegration into society.34  This commitment
to rehabilitation was effective and influential, ultimately lead-
ing to a decline in the number of civil disability statutes
throughout the states.35
The reform movement culminated with the ABA’s Stan-
dards on the Legal Status of Prisoners, which advocated for an
expungement procedure that would either lessen or remove the
burdens of civil disabilities.36  The ABA even went as far as to
predict that the prevalence of civil disabilities would be dis-
sipating.37  This movement led the House Committee on the
Judiciary to propose a sentencing reform bill that would re-
strict civil disabilities triggered by federal convictions.38  All in
all, the bill would have worked to “restore the convicted person
to the same position as before conviction.”39
Unfortunately, the civil disabilities reform movement
would be short lived—the House’s bill never passed.40  Instead
of focusing on rehabilitative efforts, both federal and state gov-
ernments adopted “tough-on-crime” approaches that focused
on incarceration and increased prison sentence durations.41
The effects of this new focus were significant.  Record numbers
of people were either serving a prison sentence or being re-
leased from prison.42
This underlying focus led to a significant expansion of civil
disabilities.  Diverging from the anti-civil-disability sentiments
that permeated the rehabilitative era, this new focus led federal
and local governments to adopt more civil disability statutes
that denied services such as public benefits, student loans,
and public housing.43  In their functional capacity, the modern
day civil disability statutes had effects that were similar to their
34 See Demleitner, supra note 21, at 155. R
35 See id.
36 Love, supra note 30, at 1714. R
37 Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of
Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1798 (2012).
38 Love, supra note 30, at 1715. R
39 Id. at 1716.
40 See id. (noting that a rival Senate bill passed instead).
41 See, e.g., Pinard, supra note 19, at 1214, 1217–18 (“Between 1980 and R
2005, the number of individuals incarcerated in U.S. prisons and jails for drug
possession offenses increased more than 1,000%.”); Chin, supra note 37, at 1804 R
(“In 1980, more than 500,000 Americans were confined to prisons and jails . . . .”).
42 Pinard, supra note 19, at 1218. R
43 As an example of this expansion, eight out of fifty-one jurisdictions sur-
veyed in 1986 required offenders to register with a law enforcement agency,
whereas that number skyrocketed to forty-six by 1996.  Kathleen M. Olivares et
al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State
Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROB. 10, 13 (1996).
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civil death counterparts.44  Moreover, because many categorize
disabilities as nonpunitive, their full effect went largely
unnoticed.45
In 2004, however, the ABA published the third edition of
the Standards for Criminal Justice.46  Here, the ABA set forth
recommended standards for legislatures to adopt that would
limit the burdensome effects of civil disabilities and notify of-
fenders of their existence.47  Under this new set of Standards,
the ABA sought to address the increase in the number of civil
disabilities statutes across the country.48  Moreover, the Stan-
dards focused on spreading greater publication and awareness
of these regulations that the ABA deemed to be “neither fair nor
efficient.”49  With an eye towards the criminal justice system’s
goal of reducing recidivism and promoting rehabilitation, the
ABA’s Standards stood as a renewed attempt to concentrate
the public’s eye on both the civil disabilities’ detrimental im-
pact on reentry and the ex-offenders’ goals of reintegrating with
their communities.50
B. What Is Punishment?  Establishing the Framework
1. General Definitions of Punishment
A dictionary provides the following definition of punish-
ment: “suffering, pain, or loss that serves as retribution.”51  In
criminal law, however, the definition takes on a more sophisti-
cated and elemental form.  In 1967, H.L.A. Hart provided a five-
element definition of punishment that is consistent with its
standard conceptualization in criminal law.  The punishment
must involve pain or consequences that one would normally
consider unpleasant.52  The punishment must be for a breach
of legal rules.53  One must impose the punishment on an actual
44 See Chin, supra note 37 at 1801–03.  One scholar has gone so far as to call R
modern day civil disability statutes “the new civil death.” Id.
45 See Pinard, supra note 19, at 1219–20 (“[I]t is difficult—essentially impos- R
sible—to fully grasp the scope of these consequences in a given jurisdiction,
because they are dispersed throughout various federal and state statutes, federal
and state regulations, and local policies.”).
46 ABA, supra note 18. R
47 Id. at 2–3.
48 Id. at 8, 12-13.
49 Id. at 11, 13.
50 See id. at 13.
51 Punishment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1009 (11th ed.
2003).
52 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 4 (2d ed. 2008).
53 Id. at 5.
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or supposed offender for their offense.  Someone other than the
offender must intentionally administer the punishment.  Fi-
nally, the person administering the punishment must have le-
gal authority within the offender’s legal system.  Central to this
definition is the concept of intentionality54 and criminal
responsibility.55
On a broader level, societal norms also play a critical role
in defining punishment: We seek to inhibit certain undesirable
behaviors while encouraging socially desirable behaviors.56
This societal view creates an institutional conceptualization of
punishment.57  Viewing punishment in a more simplistic fash-
ion, society determines that an offender’s act is wrong and
therefore deserves punishment.58  Under this view, punish-
ment “assert[s] a right and accept[s] an obligation to punish
anyone similarly circumstanced and behaved,” while the insti-
tution assumes an authoritative position.59  As a result, when
the institution or the state deprives the rights of offenders in
order to protect its citizens, that action is punishment.60  How-
ever, one suffers punishment only when the state or state’s
agent inflicts pain or suffering that the criminal would consider
“unpleasant.”61  Some scholars would even go so far as to re-
quire that the state design the punishment to “censure and to
stigmatize” the offender.62
Nevertheless, not all scholars subscribe to these traditional
conceptualizations of punishment.  One scholar, Leo Zaibert,
recommends conceptualizing punishment from the perspective
of the punisher.63  Under this view, an additional component
exists when defining a punishment: The punisher must feel
indignation towards the offender’s actions and inflict harm that
the punisher believes will be painful.64  The punisher’s beliefs
and feelings—the actor’s indignation as Zaibert explains—are
54 See Adam J. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1, 5
(2012).
55 See Julian P. Alexander, The Philosophy of Punishment, 13 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 235, 236 (1922).
56 See HART, supra note 52, at 6. R
57 See LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION 21 (2006).
58 See Alexander, supra note 55, at 238. R
59 ZAIBERT, supra note 57, at 21 (quoting Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: R
Moral or Political?, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 321, 321 (2002)).
60 See Alexander, supra note 55, at 239. R
61 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 12 (7th ed. 2015).
62 Douglas Husak, Lifting the Cloak: Preventive Detention as Punishment, 48
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1173, 1182 (2011).
63 See ZAIBERT, supra note 57, at 29. R
64 See id. at 31–33 (explaining the beliefs that are central to the author’s
theory of punishment).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-2\CRN205.txt unknown Seq: 10 17-JAN-17 13:03
522 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:513
most important when determining whether the punisher is in-
flicting punishment.65  This is true whether the offender be-
lieves the punisher is actually inflicting punishment upon them
or whether the punisher has actual or perceived authority over
the offender.66  As a consequence of this indignation and desire
to burden, even unintended but foreseeable inflictions of harm
stemming from intentionally inflicted actions may—and argua-
bly should—come within the purview of this definition of pun-
ishment.67  Indeed, as Professor Adam Kolber has noted in his
literature, “Even if we can distinguish intentional and merely
foreseen harms, it is not clear why the distinction has any
intrinsic moral salience.”68
2. How We Will Define Punishment
Finding a definition of punishment is understandably diffi-
cult, and as the above demonstrates, rather imprecise.  Even
so, establishing the boundaries of the definition is critical to
expounding proper justifications.  There are certain forms of
punishment that society deems to be “foolish” for the law to
pursue and better left to non-state actors.”69  On the other
hand, there are certain behaviors which society deems neces-
sary for the law to regulate.70  In pursuit of this necessary
regulation, H.L.A. Hart’s definition provides the traditional
baseline account of the critical elements of punishment, due in
part to its requirement of intentionality—both in the punish-
ment’s infliction and its consequences.71  This account is best
coupled with the institutional conceptualization of punishment
so as to communicate society’s values, in turn legitimizing the
state and its infliction of punishment.72
65 See id. at 48.
66 See id. at 59–60 (explaining that there may be cases that are not punish-
ment where a penalty is inflicted but the punisher does not feel the felon deserves
it).
67 See id. at 51.
68 Kolber, supra note 54, at 7.  Professor Kolber criticizes these justifications R
of punishment that address only the “intentional aspects” of punishment, calling
them “seriously incomplete.” Id. at 3.  This is a position that this Note adopts as
well. See infra section I.B.2.
69 HART, supra note 52, at 7. R
70 See id.
71 See id. at 5.
72 Cf. ZAIBERT, supra note 57, at 65 (“An institution exists at a certain time R
and place when the actions specified by it are regularly carried out in accordance
with a public understanding that the system of rules defining the institution is to
be followed.” (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48 (rev. ed. 1999)); Chris-
topher J. Peters, Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as Adjudication, 96 NW.
U. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2001) (describing John Rawls view of political legitimacy and
how it stems from the basic issues of justice).
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This definition alone, however, is too narrow. It would ex-
clude legitimate—and sometimes significant—state (i.e., gov-
ernment) actions from the purview of punishment, in turn
shielding these actions from the same scrutiny we often exact
upon traditional forms of punishment.73  This exclusion occurs
because the state action—such as the imposition of civil disa-
bilities—lacks the requisite intentionality we often see en-
trenched in the traditional punishment analysis.74  Such a
major shortcoming creates a woefully underinclusive system of
punishment.  That said, these shortcomings can easily be recti-
fied.  To do so, we must incorporate additional factors into the
definition.  Accordingly, a more complete definition should add
Zaibert and Kolber’s inclusion of the unintentional but foresee-
able harms that result from the intentional inflictions of
impairment.75
This integrated definition is better suited to account for
state-imposed, but facially neutral, regulations.  Because a pri-
mary facet of punishment is to subject the offender to suffering,
pain, and overall burden, this definition would include state
actions that would otherwise be overlooked in an analysis of
punishments.  The definition puts the onus on the state to
readily account for and justify the different penalties and depri-
vation of rights that it imposes on the violators of state-estab-
lished social order.76
II
CIVIL DISABILITIES: PUNISHMENT OR CONSEQUENCE?
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Trop v. Dulles showcases
how framing is critical to the conceptual standing of civil disa-
73 Cf. Kolber, supra note 54, at 14 (describing how, in the context of incarcer- R
ation, “[w]e need to justify such harsh treatment because it would be wrong to
cause distress or restrict people’s freedoms in these ways without good reason”).
74 See id. at 2–3, 5 (noting that punishment theorists agree that conduct
must be intentional to constitute punishment and explaining that “[s]ome schol-
ars . . . claim that we need not address unintentional aspects of punishment . . .
because these side effects are not imposed intentionally and are therefore not
punishment”).
75 See ZAIBERT, supra note 57, at 49–50 (“It is true that in most cases the R
punisher indeed intends to inflict the punishment, but there are cases in which
she might not intend to inflict the unpleasant consequences and which . . . ought
to be recognized as instances of punishment.”); see also Kolber, supra note 54, at
6 (arguing that “when we consider the severity of punishment, we consider more
than just those aspects of punishment that are intentionally administered”).
76 See ZAIBERT, supra note 57, at 51 (“The actor can be taken to intend . . . R
other consequences known to be inseparable from the consequence he desires,
even though they are not themselves desired.” (quoting GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, THE
MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME 11 (1965))).
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bilities in the criminal law landscape.77  In the Trop opinion,
the Court compared two statutes, one authorizing denaturali-
zation and the other deportation.78  The Court first explained
that “the statute authorizing deportation of an alien . . . was
viewed, not as designed to punish [the offender] for the
crime . . . but as an implementation of the sovereign power to
exclude.”79  Yet the Court ultimately held that denaturalization
resulting from a wartime desertion conviction was cruel and
unusual under the Eighth Amendment due to the statute’s
punitive nature.80  This distinction highlights the importance
of properly conceptualizing civil disabilities.81  How the stat-
utes are framed—either as punitive or nonpunitive—will ulti-
mately dictate the necessary legal analysis that courts and
scholars will apply when analyzing civil disabilities.  As the
following section will reveal, the burdensome effects and un-
derlying rationales of civil disability statutes demonstrate that
civil disabilities function as a form of punishment.  Therefore,
government lawmakers must justify their broad imposition on
ex-offenders.
A. Civil Disabilities as Nonpunitive Consequences
The traditional framework conceptualizes civil disabilities
as nonpunitive civil sanctions.82  One general rationale under-
lying this nonpunitive scheme is that civil disabilities are
merely consequences that stem from conviction; as such, this
framework positions civil disabilities as risk-prevention mea-
sures instead of as punitive devices.83  The underlying ratio-
nale is that the state is not imposing the consequences because
of any wrong that the offender has committed; instead, the
77 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
78 Id. at 98, 101.
79 Id. at 98 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
80 Id. at 101.
81 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003) (holding that the
Alaska Sex Offender Act was nonpunitive and therefore did not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 157–60 (1960) (holding that
Section 8 of the New York Waterfront Commission Act of 1953, which disqualified
individuals with a prior felony conviction from employment, was not in violation of
the Due Process Clause).
82 See Hoskins, supra note 11, at 250 (“On this view, punishment is handed R
down by a sentencing judge for a particular defendant, whereas these other mea-
sures are created by legislative or regulatory bodies and imposed on entire classes
of individuals.”).
83 See Andrew von Hirsch & Martin Wasik, Civil Disqualifications Attending
Conviction: A Suggested Conceptual Framework, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 599, 606
(1997) (“If disqualifications thus serve as civil risk-prevention measures, their use
and limitations applying to them should be governed by concerns about risk.”).
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state is attempting to broadly prevent future misconducts and
foster public safety.84  Under this reasoning, the imposition of
civil disabilities does not carry the intent85 or social condemna-
tion86 needed for punishment.  Those in support of the
nonpunitive scheme are quick to note the conceptual difference
between the logic underlying civil disabilities and punitive
statutes.87
This difference is twofold.  First, the state inflicts punish-
ments because of the offender’s particular offense, whereas the
state categorically imposes civil disabilities as a regulation
across a population rather than because of any particular of-
fense.88  Second, the nonpunitive scheme does not treat civil
disabilities as intentionally burdensome, a necessary condition
for punishment under the traditional scheme.89  Instead,
under this rationale, any burden that an ex-offender faces is
unintentional and non-essential to the state’s criminal
policy.90
Yet this view suffers from a particular shortcoming.  Even if
the restrictions are not intentionally burdensome, such bur-
dens are nevertheless foreseeable.  Given that state legislators
intentionally promulgate civil disability statutes, it is not a far
stretch to conclude that the ex-offender’s burden is foresee-
able, even if unintentional, and in turn that foreseeability un-
derlies the statutes’ promulgation.  In fact, this reasoning is
consistent with Zaibert’s punitive scheme.91
As a second rationale, supporters of the nonpunitive
scheme contend that even if intentional burdens can be
gleaned from the passage of civil disability statutes, these stat-
utes do not reflect any legislative condemnation.92  This view,
however, is also not entirely accurate.  As Zachary Hoskins
notes, civil disabilities may not need to reflect any condemna-
tion from the legislators but instead reflect condemnation from
84 See id.
85 See HART, supra note 52, at 5. R
86 See Alexander, supra note 55, at 238. R
87 See von Hirsch & Wasik, supra note 83, at 612. R
88 Hoskins, supra note 11, at 255. R
89 Id. at 258–60 (“To count as punishment, the measure must be a condem-
natory, intentionally burdensome response to the offense.”).
90 See id. at 258–59.
91 See ZAIBERT, supra note 57, at 49–51. But see Hoskins, supra note 11, at R
258–59 (noting the possibility of foreseeable but unintentional burdens that are
non-essential to the state’s policy).
92 See Hoskins, supra note 11, at 258 (questioning how the condemnatory R
aspect of punishment fits in with the general scheme of civil disabilities).
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the community whom the legislators represent.93  This point is
consistent with an institutional view of punishment, which in
turn lends further support to the punitive conceptualization of
civil disabilities.94
B. Civil Disabilities as Punishment
Notwithstanding the traditional views, there is increasing
support to conceptualize civil disabilities as punishment.95
This support stems from the negative consequences and severe
burdens that flow from these civil disabilities.96  As a direct
criticism of those who claim that civil disabilities are purely
regulatory and lack a punitive nature, some scholars have
noted that dichotomous (i.e., punitive and regulatory) results
emerge when applying them in practice.97  An example will
shed light on this dichotomy.
Suppose a state passes the following civil disability: If the
state convicts a driver of a dangerous speeding offense—for
example driving one hundred miles per hour in a thirty mile per
hour zone—the state will, in addition to sentencing the offender
to jail time, suspend the offender’s license, bar the offender
from driving, and publicly post this information online and at
the offender’s local DMV.98  One who subscribes to the
nonpunitive view will note that the purpose here is merely to
regulate the offender’s civil status and ensure public safety
from an individual who has shown a prior propensity to
93 Id. at 260–61.
94 Hoskins notes that this is particularly true if the restrictions are tied to the
ex-offender’s blameworthiness. Id. at 260.
95 See, e.g., Hugh LaFollette, Collateral Consequences of Punishment: Civil
Penalties Accompanying Formal Punishment, 22 J. APPLIED PHIL. 241, 244 (2005)
(noting that some literature has described civil disabilities as a punishment and
agreeing with that characterization).
96 Cohen & Rivkin, supra note 27, at 25 (“The debilitating influence of civil R
disabilities on the offender is vastly magnified upon his release.”).
97 Hoskins, supra note 11, at 261 (highlighting objections to a “principled R
distinction between punishment and civil measures”).  This dichotomy between
prevention and punishment is prevalent in the concept of preventative punish-
ment, a controversial theory of punishment that seeks to pre-emptively punish
individuals based on a perceived risk to society. See generally Husak, supra note
62, at 1174–80 (providing a definition and example of preventive detention). R
98 For the purposes of this Note, I have created an extreme situation.  A mere
license suspension may cause hardships but not necessarily, if at all, reflect the
necessary degree of societal condemnation and intention that a punishment re-
quires.  The scenario set forth tends to be more consistent with the nature of civil
disabilities.
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speed.99  It follows then that the state is not imposing the li-
cense suspension because of the conviction or with any inten-
tion to burden or condemn the offender.100  The state is only
restricting certain rights as a consequence of the offender’s new
societal “status”—in this case, a reckless driver.
But the imposition of this disability triggers more than a
mere suspension.  The state has effectively hampered and sus-
pended the actor’s ability to travel around town, make a living,
and engage with the community.  Certainly, there are other
ways for the offender to adapt to the situation; however, one
could realistically and justifiably view these as unwanted bur-
dens or unpleasant experiences.  Applying Hart’s elemental ap-
proach demonstrates how this seemingly regulatory disability
is punitive: (1) the burdens are triggered after a conviction for
violating the law, here speeding seventy miles per hour over the
speed limit; (2) consistent with Zaibert’s punishment definition
extension, the statute imposes a burden that the offender will
find unpleasant and unwelcomed, regardless of the state’s in-
tentions; (3) the state’s imposition of the statute was inten-
tional; (4) the legal authority administering the punishment,
here the state legislature, is imposing this suspension as a
result of the offender’s breach of duty within that authority’s
legal system; and (5) although the statute may initially appear
to be creating a consequential scheme that lacks any punitive
intent and is unrelated to any one offender’s particular convic-
tion, the statute’s burdens only trigger because the state has
found the offender guilty of a qualifying infraction.101  In other
words, there is a direct link between the offense and the
restriction.
This example highlights how civil disabilities can function
as punishments even when the facial purpose is regulatory.
Because the state has occasioned a sanction that is contingent
on the offender’s offense and conduct, here a reckless speeding
conviction, it follows that the particular conduct has triggered
the disability’s imposition.  The offense really is a causal factor
99 Cf. Hoskins, supra note 11, at 255 (“We sentence a man to prison for R
murdering his brother, or to a term of probation for shoplifting.  The punishment
is a response to the offense.”).
100 Id.
101 See HART, supra note 52, at 4–5; ZAIBERT, supra note 57, at 49.  In a recent R
article, Margaret Colgate Love noted that “[w]hether or not any individual collat-
eral consequence is punishment, the overall susceptibility to collateral conse-
quences is punishment.”  Margaret Colgate Love, Managing Collateral
Consequences in the Sentencing Process: The Revised Sentencing Articles of the
Model Penal Code, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 247, 259–60 (2015) (alteration in original)
(quoting Chin, supra note 37, at 1826). R
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of the state acting with such purposeful force.102  Another key
component is the underlying harm that the offender faces.  In
both this case and the run of cases, the unintended harms are
a reasonably foreseeable result of the state’s intentional os-
tracization and regulation.  Even if these disabilities are
promulgated with a regulatory purpose and an eye to the of-
fenders’ demonstrated proclivity to offend, they nevertheless
are still intentionally imposed on offenders and reflect the
state’s underlying reproach of the offenders’ actions.  These
factors blend together to paint civil disabilities in a punitive
light and catapult them squarely into the realm of
punishment.103
C. Why the Punitive Conceptualization Works
In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court rejected a convicted
sex offender’s Ex Post Facto Clause challenge on grounds that
Alaska’s “Megan’s Law” statute was not punitive in nature and
therefore did not qualify for any Ex Post Facto Clause analy-
sis.104  Although attempting to enter into the minds of Justices
in the majority would be an impossible task, it is telling that
the case was decided as a 6-3 decision with several of the
Justices noting the punitive nature of the statute.  A punitive
conceptualization of civil disabilities may have moved this deci-
sion in a different direction by forcing the Court to confront the
Ex Post Facto Clause ramifications of the statute.105  Further
supporting this hypothesis is the fact that courts have grown
more uncomfortable with categorically characterizing civil disa-
bilities as nonpunitive.106
102 See Vincent Chiao, Punishment and Permissibility in the Criminal Law, 32
LAW & PHIL. 729, 734 (2013) (setting forth “Principle R” which states that “A does
not punish B unless A treats B’s actual or supposed prior wrongdoing as a reason
for responding as she does”). But see Husak, supra note 62, at 1182 (arguing that R
“a state response to conduct does not qualify as punitive unless it is designed to
censure and to stigmatize”).
103 See Kolber, supra note 54, at 5 (“If a guard decided to supplement a pris- R
oner’s official punishment by beating him, this would be punishment . . . .  But if
the guard accidentally stepped on the prisoner’s toe and broke it, this would not
be punishment . . . .” (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir.
1985))).
104 538 U.S. 84, 89, 105–06 (2003).
105 See, e.g., id. at 107 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[F]or me this is a close case,
for I not only agree with the Court that there is evidence pointing to an intended
civil characterization of the Act, but also see considerable evidence [supporting a
punitive basis].”).
106 See Love, supra note 101, at 259 (noting that “there are signs that courts R
may be growing uncomfortable with the mechanical distinction between direct
and collateral consequences”).
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Ultimately, the punitive conceptualization of civil disabili-
ties is a more compelling approach, particularly because the
existence of civil disabilities is burdensome and constricting on
both an economic and social scale.107  Given the prevalence of
these statutes across both state and federal jurisdictions,108 a
punitive characterization of civil disabilities would provide
greater clarity to legislatures when drafting these statutes.
Moreover, a punitive conceptualization will help to make the
derivative effects and consequences of the statutes resonate
more profoundly with state actors.
D. Implications
Courts have not historically used civil disabilities in calcu-
lating criminal sentences.109  As such, adopting the above
analysis presents an important future ramification, as sentenc-
ing procedures may likely need to undergo an adjustment.  Be-
cause civil disabilities have been classified as a form of
punishment, it follows that states should alter overall sentenc-
ing to take this conceptualization into account.110  This modifi-
cation rests on retributive proportionality grounds.111  For
example, in the case of the drug offenders, the prison sentence
could be shortened to take into account the additional civil
burdens that offender will face upon release from prison.  Al-
though a court would still need to consider many other factors
when determining the felon’s final sentence, the inclusion of
civil disabilities into the sentencing calculus will help create an
appropriate sentence.  This in turn makes the total punish-
ment more proportional to the offense.
107 See id. at 255–56.
108 Tway & Gitlen, supra note 16, at 16 (noting that there are at least 39,548 R
collateral consequences in the United States).
109 Ruth A. Moyer, Avoiding “Magic Mirrors”—A Post-Padilla Congressional So-
lution to the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 “Custody” and “Collateral” Sanctions Dilemma, 67
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 753, 761 (2012) (noting that collateral consequences are
not considered “explicit punishment[s] handed down by the court”) (quoting
Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Crimi-
nal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals,
86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634 (2006)).
110 See, e.g., United States v. Chong, No. 13-CR-570, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
135664, at *14–16 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2014) (explaining that courts should take
civil disabilities into account to impose a “just punishment”).
111 DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 16–17. R
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III
THE JUSTIFICATION AND NARROWING OF CIVIL DISABILITIES
A. Can Civil Disabilities Be Justified?
Having conceptualized civil disabilities as punishment, it
follows that they require justification.  So the question re-
mains: Can civil disabilities be justified?  I posit that the initial
answer to this question is yes when looking at them from a
broad perspective and using utilitarian and retributivist theo-
ries of punishment.
The utilitarian principles will justify punishment when the
punishment serves to promote either general or individual de-
terrence.112  Whether one views civil disabilities as punitive or
nonpunitive, the underlying goal of these statutes is deterrence
and prevention.113  As such, by applying the utilitarian ratio-
nale, civil disabilities are justified at a broad level as a form of
punishment.  This is true whether framing the statutes
through general or individual deterrence.
At the general deterrence level, the state promulgates the
civil disabilities with an eye towards community protection; in
turn, the goal is to prevent potential future misconduct by
communicating the consequences of a particular criminal of-
fense through the stigma stemming from civil disabilities.114
Some scholars argue that the general deterrence rationale is
insufficient to justify civil disabilities, especially since many in
the community are unaware of the existence of civil disabili-
ties.115  Nevertheless, the state designs these civil disabilities to
prevent ex-offenders from engaging in certain activities and to
withhold certain rights that ex-offenders would otherwise pos-
sess.  Under this scheme, civil disabilities maintain social order
and deter crime by preventing the individual offender from
acting.116
112 Id. at 15.
113 See Marlaina Freisthler & Mark A. Godsey, Going Home to Stay: A Review
of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, Post-Incarceration Employment, and Re-
cidivism in Ohio, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 525, 529 (2005) (explaining that collateral
consequences have preventive justifications).
114 Cf. VALLAS & DIETRICH, supra note 9, at 2 (noting that criminal records R
present life-long consequences for ex-offenders and create a stigma against the
ex-offender).
115 See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Con-
fronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 508–09 (2010) (arguing
that general deterrence is not a satisfactory rationale in legitimizing the imposi-
tion of civil disabilities because individuals are generally unaware of their
existence).
116 See DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 14–15. R
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This is the reasoning underlying both individual deterrence
and the utilitarian goal of incapacitation.117  Instead of a broad,
community-focused scope, the aim of civil disabilities is at
preventing an individual from engaging in future miscon-
duct.118  Although the standard example of incapacitation is
imprisonment of the offender to prevent societal harm,119 this
concept is equally applicable to civil disabilities due to their
incapacitating qualities.
Civil disabilities, at least on a general level, also find justifi-
cation from a retributive standpoint.  In particular, the state’s
imposition of civil disabilities is akin to serving the ex-offenders
with their just desert, i.e. punishment in proportion to the
seriousness of the harm.120  More specifically, civil disabilities
fall under the realm of protective retribution, where the ex-
offender violates a set of societal rules and the state imposes
civil disabilities both as a means of having ex-offenders pay
their societal debt and protecting the “moral balance in [ ] soci-
ety.”121  The goals underlying civil disabilities work to achieve
retributive justice by communicating to the ex-offenders that
they have engaged in conduct that “conveys disrespect for im-
portant [societal] values,” and as such they deserve the burden
they now face.122
The critical rationale driving both the utilitarian and retrib-
utive justifications is that the state is imposing this punish-
ment to achieve certain goals derived from societal
expectations.  On one hand, the state aims to protect citizens
and prevent criminal conduct, thus making the community
safer as a whole;123 on the other hand, the state wants to
ensure that ex-offenders pay their societal debts stemming
from their breach of societal values and rules.124  These goals
carry legitimate benefits for the state to pursue for the commu-
nity—general community protection, denied access to recidivist
117 Id. at 15 (explaining how incapacitation “[q]uite simply” prevents offenders
from committing crimes in society through a “period of segregation”).
118 See Pinard, supra note 115, at 508. R
119 Dressler, supra note 61, at 15. R
120 See E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing
and Mental Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 186–87 (explaining the
general concept of just desert and its role in sentencing policy).
121 See DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 17. R
122 Id. at 19.  Under retributive justice, the offender has engaged in some
“wrongdoing” and for that reason they should take responsibility as a “moral
agent” in society while the state punishes their actions. See Dan Markel, Retribu-
tive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 239, 258–60 (2009).
123 See DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 15. R
124 See id. at 17–19.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-2\CRN205.txt unknown Seq: 20 17-JAN-17 13:03
532 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:513
opportunities, and communicated societal expectations, to
name a few.  The benefits are certainly a noble cause for the
state to pursue, and as such they justify the use of civil disabil-
ities from a general standpoint.  However, relying on the forego-
ing analysis alone would ignore the full scope of civil
disabilities’ impact.
B. The Narrowly Tailored Standard: A Cost-Benefit and
Constitutional Justification
Despite the broad justifications, civil disabilities are not
imposed in a vacuum.  When viewed in the grand punitive
scheme, they carry demonstrable costs.  As such, an overarch-
ing application of these forms of punishment is ultimately un-
tenable and unwarranted.125  The ABA has recognized this
dilemma and through the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice,
they call for states to limit civil disabilities to those that are
“closely related” to the offense.126  When analyzing this frame-
work under both a constitutional and cost-benefit analysis, one
can see not only the merits of adopting such a framework but
also how states should tailor statutes even more narrowly than
the ABA recommends, moving from closely related to directly
related.
1. A Constitutional Framing
The Supreme Court has recognized that there are several
constitutionally protected individual and fundamental liberty
interests under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment.127  In
particular, there is a “liberty from confinement” which includes
“freedom from bodily restraint.”128  To deprive a citizen of these
liberty interests, the state must have a compelling interest.129
One such compelling interest is public safety.130  Notwith-
standing these legitimate interests, the Court in Shelton v.
Tucker explained that “even though the governmental purpose
125 See Demleitner, supra note 21, at 160 (“The current lack of a coherent R
framework for collateral consequences leads to disproportionate, irrational, and
unjust results by painting with too broad a brush.”).
126 ABA, supra note 18, at 23–24. R
127 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration:
Why Is This Right Different from All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 785
(1994).
128 Colb, supra note 127, at 787–88. R
129 Id. at 785–87.
130 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (noting that the
Court has “repeatedly held that the Government’s regulatory interest in commu-
nity safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty
interest”).
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be legitimate . . . that purpose cannot be pursued by means
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved.”131
Concededly, the rights that civil disabilities implicate are
not necessarily included among the fundamental personal lib-
erties embedded in due process jurisprudence.  Still, functional
and productive community membership is preconditioned on
the availability of many of the rights and benefits that civil
disabilities ultimately restrict.  In their most fundamental con-
ceptualization, civil disabilities function as a constraint on the
ex-offender’s ability to engage in normal day-to-day living.  This
includes restrictions on housing, income, employment, and ed-
ucation—all essentials to proper integration within the com-
munity.132  As such, the compelling interest rationale
underlying liberty-interest protection finds legitimate support
in the context of civil disabilities.  This in turn supports the
need for the narrow tailoring of civil disability statutes.  Such
burdens may not fit within the traditional meaning of confine-
ment or bodily restraint, but their effects create a de facto
restriction of the offender’s bodily freedoms—in this case, the
ability to engage in the essentials of day-to-day livelihood.
To see this framework in action, take for example the case
of a convicted sex offender.  The state restricts the offender
from inhabiting property near parks and schools.133  Such reg-
ulations function as a constraint by restricting the offender’s
mobility within the community.  These restrictions, however,
are narrowly tailored and highlight why a direct relationship
between the civil disability and the offense is necessary.134  In
the hypothetical above, the sex offender has shown a clear
predisposition for sexual offenses.  Although the imposition of
this civil disability is inhibiting and constraining the offender’s
choices of where to live and work, this limitation of the of-
fender’s opportunity to harm is a legitimate and justified gov-
ernment action that advances public safety.  Note the one-to-
one relation between the criminal conduct and civil disability:
there is a direct link between the conviction and the disabil-
ity.135  This direct link is critical to ensure proper narrow tailor-
ing.  By establishing a clear link, the state has properly tailored
the disability to achieve a legitimate governmental goal.
131 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
132 See Demleitner, supra note 21, at 155–58 (outlining the various restric- R
tions that civil disabilities impose on ex-offenders).
133 Hoskins, supra note 11, at 249. R
134 ABA, supra note 18, at 23–24. R
135 See id. at 24.
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This principle should guide states when passing civil disa-
bilities statutes.  If the disability bears a functional and direct
relationship to the conviction, then the disability is justified;
conversely, if the disability bears a mere secondary or tertiary
connection (or no connection at all), then the civil disability is
overly broad and the state should do away with—or at the very
least modify—the restriction.136  To give another example
under this framework, a civil disability statute that grants pub-
lic housing operators the power to deny public housing to an
ex-offender with a drug-possession conviction would not pass
muster—the offense bears no direct relation to the civil disabil-
ity.137  There may be legitimate public safety concerns that
state is addressing, but the civil disability creates costly bur-
dens and does not achieve that goal in the narrowest manner
possible.  In lacking any particularized and direct connection
between the offender’s drug-related conduct and the use of
public housing, such a dramatic constriction of the offender’s
choice and mobility finds no justification for its continued
existence.
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Applying a cost-benefit analysis helps to support this nar-
row tailoring proposition.  As previously noted, there is a legiti-
mate interest in public safety.  Civil disabilities help promote
that interest by withholding particular rights that the state has
deemed as too risky for an ex-offender to possess.  Even so, the
costs associated with civil disabilities are significant.  Ex-of-
fenders struggle to find employment, in turn leading to bleak
economic situations.138  They may become temporarily ineligi-
ble for benefits like social security, limiting their total incomes
at a time when they are attempting to get back on their feet.139
And they lose access to student loans, which hinders their
ability to get an education, earn a higher expected income, and
136 The ABA notes that “denial of licensure where the offense involves the
licensed activity” would be a justifiable civil disability. Id.  I would argue that,
although there may be a close relation, the state legislatures must do more—the
actual offense is what needs to be analyzed when determining if the license gets
suspended, not merely that the offense during the course of a licensed activity.
137 The argument that courts have set forth for denying public benefits is that
it would “save taxpayer money”; even so, saving taxpayer money bears no direct
(or arguably even indirect) relation to a drug-possession conviction. See Chin,
supra note 37, at 1809. R
138 See Genevieve J. Miller, Comment, Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 119, 131–32 (2012).
139 See id. at 121.
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properly integrate in society.140  Due to these compounding
consequences, many ex-offenders return to crime.141  This vi-
cious cycle in turn leads to higher recidivism rates and effec-
tively negates the benefits that these punishments may have
provided, an outcome quite contrary to the public safety goals
imbedded in civil disabilities legislation.142
As scholar Nora Demleitner has noted, “a well-planned sys-
tem of [civil disabilities] may lead to the greater inclusion of ex-
offenders within society.”143  Of course, narrowly tailored civil
disabilities will not negate all the potential costs and burdens.
Nonetheless, narrow tailoring creates more precision and pro-
motes greater effectiveness within the realm of criminal law.
Moreover, narrow tailoring properly balances the oft-clashing
goals of deterrence, prevention, and rehabilitation.  The state
continues to pursue the desirable goals of community safety
while minimizing the costs associated with pursuing these le-
gitimate goals.  By narrowly tailoring civil disabilities, the state
prevents social fragmentation and encourages the successful
rehabilitation and reentry of the offender, while the ex-offend-
ers receive their just desert.144
IV
SHAPING OUR POLICIES AND REDUCING RECIDIVISM
Taken as a whole, the narrow tailoring framework for civil
disabilities can be used to combat high recidivism rates.  This
Note will focus on three particularly problematic areas of civil
disability restrictions that are linked to ex-offender recidivism:
public housing, education funding, and employment.145  By
ensuring that a directly related crime is what triggers the civil
disability, lawmakers can take steps to ensure that ex-offend-
ers are not unnecessarily deprived of opportunities to succeed
upon their release from prison.  Furthermore, these reforms
will provide significant monetary savings to the states and their
140 See id. at 133–34.
141 Id. at 136.
142 See Slifer, supra note 5 (noting that 58% of released prisoners were re- R
arrested within five years of their initial release).
143 Demleitner, supra note 21, at 161. R
144 See id. (noting that the current preventative rationale underlying civil disa-
bilities creates “societal fragmentation and thwarts possible rehabilitation”).
145 See Lorelei Laird, Ex-Offenders Face Tens of Thousands of Legal Restric-
tions, Bias and Limits on Their Rights, ABA JOURNAL (June 1, 2013, 10:00 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ex-offenders_face_tens_of_
thousands_of_legal_restrictions [https://perma.cc/26CP-ECYB]; Miller, supra
note 138, at 133. R
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criminal justice systems.146  These reforms should help to re-
duce the probability of an ex-offender recommitting crimes and
in turn reduce recidivism rates across the board.147
What the following will offer in terms of recommendations
is not an absolute solution nor is it the only area of the law that
must undergo robust reformations. Yet the implementation of
these reforms, along with an increased focus on developing the
public’s awareness of the challenges that ex-offenders face, can
help to lower recidivism rates across the country.148
A. Fostering Reintegration
1. Remove Public Housing Bans
Public housing provides affordable housing to low-income
families and households.149  A criminal conviction, however,
may trigger mandatory or discretionary restrictions and dis-
qualify ex-offenders from receiving these benefits.150  These re-
strictions can lead to increases in both homelessness rates and
incarceration rates amongst ex-offenders.151  For state officials
attempting to reduce recidivism, these outcomes are clearly
counterproductive.
Studies have shown a link between housing and recidivism
rates.152  A narrowly tailored civil disability scheme should
help to combat these crippling challenges by removing public
146 State leaders in North Carolina and Ohio have projected savings of $560
million and $78 million, respectively, in averted costs and cumulative savings.
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., LESSONS FROM THE STATES: REDUCING RECIDI-
VISM AND CURBING CORRECTIONS COSTS THROUGH JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 4 (2013).
147 Cf. Pinard, supra note 109, at 681–82 (discussing how the Second Chance R
Act of 2005 reflects Congress’ recognition of the connection between collateral
consequences and reentry).
148 While this Note has the benefit of approaching these legal challenges in
isolation, these issues are nevertheless quite complex from a practical standpoint.
My goal is to provide a new way of thinking about these issues and to generate
conversation in the criminal justice community.  That said, I acknowledge that a
solution is not a simple endeavor.  See JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL
RECORD 269–74 (2015) for an extended discussion of the lack of a ready solution
that can be drawn from collateral consequence critiques.
149 Marah A. Curtis et al., Alcohol, Drug, and Criminal History Restrictions in
Public Housing, 15 CITYSCAPE 37, 38 (2013).  Federal public housing benefits in-
clude the public housing program, Housing Choice Voucher Program, and Section
8 rental assistance. Id.
150 See NINO RODRIGUEZ & BRENNER BROWN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PREVENTING
HOMELESSNESS AMONG PEOPLE LEAVING PRISON 3 (2003).
151 See id.
152 See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34287, OFFENDER REENTRY:
CORRECTIONAL STATISTICS, REINTEGRATION INTO THE COMMUNITY, AND RECIDIVISM 15
(2015) (noting studies that show reduced recidivism rates among ex-offenders
participating in halfway house programs).
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housing restrictions that contribute to homelessness rates153
and in turn, higher recidivism.154  In cases where the felony
pertains to a direct abuse of public housing, these restrictions
are justified.155  Conversely, if the particular offense does not
pertain to the use of public housing, the benefits of providing
public housing to ex-offenders outweigh the potential costs.156
Critics may argue that this policy would create an unaccept-
able risk on public housing; however, as scholar James Jacobs
notes, this solution is workable in practice.157  For example,
public housing officials could implement aggressive eviction
policies if dealing with problematic tenants with prior convic-
tion histories.158  Reducing recidivism means improving barri-
ers to reentry.  Implementing narrowly tailored prohibitions on
public housing brings us one step closer to this goal.
2. Remove Bans on Education Funding
Today, having a college degree has become something of a
prerequisite for gainful employment and life stability.159  Con-
sequently, ex-offenders face numerous obstacles to obtaining
the necessary funding for their college education.  For example,
153 See Mireya Navarro, Ban on Former Inmates in Public Housing Is Eased,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/nyregion/
ban-on-former-inmates-in-public-housing-is-eased.html [https://perma.cc/
6D6S-2AEE] (explaining that the New York City Housing Authority is easing its
ban on recently released prisoners in order to reduce homelessness).
154 See Kathleen F. Donovan, Note, No Hope for Redemption: The False Choice
Between Safety and Justice in Hope VI Ex-Offender Admissions Policies, 3 DEPAUL
J. FOR SOC. JUST. 173, 189 (2010) (discussing the link between exclusionary public
housing policies and increased recidivism).
155 For example, federal public housing guidelines mandate a complete ban of
public housing to those ex-offenders with previous conviction for methampheta-
mine production on public-housing premises.  24 C.F.R. § 960.204(a)(3) (2015).
156 See JACOBS, supra note 148, at 258 (noting that those public-housing R
exclusions based on drug use are overinclusive); Gigi Starr, Pros & Cons of Public
Housing, SFGATE, http://homeguides.sfgate.com/pros-cons-public-housing-
8497.html [https://perma.cc/6PHE-MF55] (discussing the pros and cons of pub-
lic housing for residents and communities).  But see Raymond V. Mariano, Public
Housing Solves the Symptom – Homelessness – But Should Focus on the Problem,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 12, 2016, 2:18 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ray
mond-v-mariano/public-housing-solves-the_b_8929814.html [https://perma.
cc/3QWV-VR2W] (noting that although public housing solves homelessness, pub-
lic housing does not address the underlying issue of lack of work experience).
157 See JACOBS, supra note 148, at 259. R
158 Id.
159 See Robert Farrington, A College Degree Is the New High School Diploma,
FORBES (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertfarrington/2014/
09/29/a-college-degree-is-the-new-high-school-diploma/#2715e4857a0b5b11
c9214cbe [https://perma.cc/M7M8-RLQS] (noting that the struggle of high
school graduates to obtain employment highlights how college has essentially
become a mandatory endeavor).
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Congress has prohibited convicted drug offenders from receiv-
ing various forms of federal student loans and grants.160  More-
over, a prior conviction will disqualify an aspiring college
student from receiving Pell Grants—loans that do not require
repayment.161  These restrictions pose a legitimate threat to the
ex-offender’s goal of successful reentry and lawmakers’ goal of
recidivism reduction.162
Those in support of this restricted access to financial aid
use deterrence principles to justify their positions.  For exam-
ple, restricting a drug offender’s access to financial aid would
in turn discourage drug use.163  Yet scholars have noted that
such a policy does not actually bear a connection to public
safety.164  Moreover, it is clear that education, or lack thereof,
is correlated to criminal propensity.165  As part of the process of
implementing narrowly tailored civil disabilities to reduce re-
cidivism, lawmakers should reduce or remove the financial
barriers that ex-offenders face when seeking to obtain a college
education.
Although colleges have legitimate student body safety con-
cerns, schools could address these concerns in other ways.  For
example, schools could implement stricter screening and vet-
ting processes of applicants and careful, individualized risk-
assessments prior to admission.  Restricting access to loans
and educational financing, however, bears no relationship to
an ex-offender’s criminal history.  Instead of encouraging ex-
offenders to obtain an education that can help establish gainful
employment and meaningful life stability, we create significant
financial restrictions during a time when college tuition is bal-
looning.166  We do so even when no functional or direct rela-
160 See JACOBS, supra note 148, at 259. R
161 See 34 C.F.R. § 668.40 (2015) (disqualifying certain ex-drug offenders from
federal education funds authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act); 34
C.F.R. § 690.2 (2015) (noting that the federal Pell Grant Program is authorized
under Title IV of the Higher Education Act).
162 See JAMES, supra note 152, at 14–15 (explaining that research shows that R
post-secondary education has a strong effect on reducing recidivism).
163 JACOBS, supra note 148, at 259–60. R
164 Id. at 260.
165 Enrico Moretti, Does Education Reduce Participation in Criminal Activi-
ties? 4–7 (Oct. 25, 2005) (unpublished Symposium Paper Presentation) (on file
with the Columbia University Teachers College).
166 One observer projects the cost of college tuition to reach $262,000 for four-
year private schools and $133,000 for four-year public schools, reflecting a yearly
increase of 2.14% and 2.80%, respectively.  Libby Kane, This Chart of Projected
Tuition Costs Will Give Anyone Saving for College the Chills, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 30,
2015, 11:15 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/projected-tuition-costs-are-
terrifying-2015-4 [https://perma.cc/8MUU-P3FS].
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tionship exists between the criminal conduct and the access to
student loans.  These current financial-aid policies may have a
deterrence goal, but their effects produce the opposite re-
sult.167  Reforming the current civil disability scheme would
increase access to higher education, reduce recidivism, and
decrease social costs.168  As is the case with public housing
civil disabilities, a narrowly tailored—or overall removal of—
student loan civil disabilities would help reduce reentry barri-
ers and promote a favorable environment to reduce recidivism.
B. Criminal Records and Narrow Tailoring
1. Criminal Records as De Facto Civil Disabilities and
Their Usage in Employment Contexts
Although not necessarily civil disabilities per se, criminal
records create many consequences and burdens for the ex-
offender.  As a result, one should view the usage of criminal
records as a de facto civil disability.  To reach this conclusion,
one should consider both the direct and indirect utilizations of
the criminal record.  First, criminal records have a direct utili-
zation against the ex-offender: the criminal justice system uses
criminal history to aid current criminal investigations,169 set
bail amounts upon arrest,170 prosecute offenders,171 and affect
the offender’s sentencing duration.172  These consequences are
legitimate and justified—one who criminally offends should
bear the consequences of their prior actions if they have chosen
to commit a new crime against the public.  Second, criminal
records affect ex-offenders outside the criminal justice system,
167 See Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, The Effect of Education on Crime:
Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 155,
183 (2004) (noting an inverse correlation between the number of years of educa-
tion and the probability of imprisonment); see also Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison
Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2008) (“Imprisonment rates are
also negatively correlated with income and education levels, meaning that those
who are already economically disadvantaged are more likely to suffer the addi-
tional economic handicaps that come with imprisonment.”).
168 See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INST., EDUCATION AND PUBLIC SAFETY 1–2 (2007)
(noting the various public benefits and effects on crime rates stemming from
increased access to education).
169 JACOBS, supra note 148, at 228. R
170 Id. at 228–29.
171 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 413–15, 609 (allowing for use of prior sexual-assault
and child molestation convictions as evidence of defendant’s character and per-
mitting use of past criminal convictions to impeach character for veracity,
respectively).
172 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING CMM’N 2010).
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often in an indirect manner.173  The United States, in particu-
lar, is unique in its usage of criminal records.  Where other
countries limit the disclosure of conviction information to
members of the criminal justice system, the United States
maintains public access to criminal records, and thus fosters a
system of maximum transparency.174  Such transparency sub-
jects the ex-offender to significant social stigmas, some justi-
fied and others less so.175  For this reason, the utilization of
criminal records outside of the criminal justice system, partic-
ularly in the employment context, is open to certain narrow
tailoring reforms.
In practice, access to ex-offenders’ criminal records creates
significant employment challenges and, in some cases, outright
employment prohibitions against ex-offenders.176  These chal-
lenges significantly impact the recidivism rates of ex-offenders:
the recidivism rate of those obtaining post-release employment
is nearly half the rate of those who do not.177  Part of the reason
why is that a criminal record effectively diminishes the em-
ployer’s perception of the ex-offender’s employability;178 in
turn, this significantly stunts any legitimate reentry or reinte-
gration attempts.  It is clear then that this area of the law is ripe
for reform, especially given the correlation between unemploy-
ment and crime rates.179  By limiting the unnecessary or unre-
173 In some cases the impact is direct.  For example, a conviction could lead to
formalized bans from particular areas of employment.  These restrictions would
fall within the realm of formal civil disabilities. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 112.011
(2014) (allowing public employers to deny employment to ex-offenders if the ex-
offender has a felony conviction or a first-degree misdemeanor conviction and the
conviction is directly related to the job).
174 JACOBS, supra note 148, at 159–61, 194–99. R
175 See id. at 96–98 (noting the stigmatic effects that a criminal record can
create).
176 See id. at 261–64, 275–77.
177 See Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for
Non-Violent Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 162 (2010) (noting that
those ex-offenders with post-release employment had a recidivism rate of 27.6%
while those who did not had a recidivism rate of 53.9%).
178 See, e.g., Marnie Eisenstadt, Car Dealer Fires Former Gang Member After
Syracuse.com Story About His Success, SYRACUSE.COM (June 17, 2015, 5:20 PM),
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2015/06/car_dealer_fires_former_
gang_member_after_syracusecom_story_about_his_success.html [https://per
ma.cc/H8LQ-KZER] (explaining how Quante Wright, an ex-gang member with a
prior federal RICO law conviction, was terminated from his employment at a
Syracuse car dealership after his employer learned the details of his criminal
history).  The Ban the Box movement seeks to prevent these types of situations.
See infra section IV.B.2.
179 See Steven Raphael & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Identifying the Effect of Unem-
ployment on Crime, 44 J. L. & ECON. 259, 280–81 (concluding that improving
employment prospects can serve as an effective tool to combat crime).  Moreover,
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lated barriers to employment that ex-offenders face upon
reentry, state lawmakers can create an environment that sup-
ports the necessary “prerequisite for successful
rehabilitation.”180
Lawmakers, however, must use great care when regulating
this area of the law.  Employers, both public and private, have
legitimate public-safety concerns.  These concerns are particu-
larly heightened when dealing with the hiring of an
ex–offender.181  Accordingly, employment reforms must take
into account the realities of the ex-offender’s criminal history.
For example, an ex-offender with a robust criminal history is
not at the same level as a one-and-done, first time offender.
With careful research and observation of the effects of imple-
menting the current initiatives—in particular the Ban the Box
movement—a narrowly tailored scheme for criminal records in
employment contexts could present a long-term solution to
curb recidivism rates.
2. A Direct Application: Ban the Box and Selective
Background Checks
With over 70 million Americans possessing an arrest re-
cord or criminal conviction, many ex-offenders have found it
difficult to obtain employment.182  Unsurprisingly, these em-
ployment difficulties can negatively impact the economy.183  As
a result of these employment challenges and related policy is-
sues, the San Francisco-based activist group All of Us or None
gainful employment can serve as an additional way to combat the negative effects
of incarceration—specifically, an effect dubbed the “criminogenic effect” of prison.
See Inimai M. Chettiar, The Many Causes of America’s Decline in Crime, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/the-
many-causes-of-americas-decline-in-crime/385364/ [https://perma.cc/FP3K-
R6E8] (explaining how the criminogenic effect increases probability of crime after
release).
180 JACOBS, supra note 148, at 297. R
181 See id. at 264 (noting the complexities inherent in ex-offender
employment).
182 Aaron Morrison, Prison Reform 2015: Ban the Box Activists Demand Action
from Congress, White House to Stop Employment Discrimination, IB TIMES (Oct. 8,
2015, 12:06 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/prison-reform-2015-ban-box-activ
ists-demand-action-congress-white-house-stop-2131532 [https://perma.cc/E7
D9-3UH5].
183 For example, economists estimated that the employment challenges stem-
ming from criminal records cost the United States between $57 and $65 billion of
lost economic output in 2008. See JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CTR. FOR ECO-
NOMIC & POLICY RESEARCH, EX-OFFENDERS AND THE LABOR MARKET 1 (2010) (explain-
ing that the drop in total male employment rate of “1.5 to 1.7 percentage points” in
2008 contributed to a reduction of “between $57 and $65 billion in lost output” in
the United States).
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(AUN) began the Ban the Box campaign to combat employment
discrimination against ex-offenders.184  The Ban the Box cam-
paign urges state lawmakers to prohibit employers from inquir-
ing into the applicant’s criminal history during the interview
process, except in cases where the ex-offender is expressly
barred from a particular job.185  AUN argues that consideration
of criminal history promotes employment discrimination and
deters ex-offenders from applying for jobs.  By preventing em-
ployers from considering criminal history during the applica-
tion process, AUN hopes to promote a cost-effective removal of
a critical barrier to the ex-offender’s rehabilitation and reinte-
gration.186  As of 2014, twelve states have adopted the Ban the
Box policy in the public sector.187  Additionally, seven of those
states have adopted Ban the Box in the private sector.188
An important aspect of the Ban the Box movement is that
employers may conduct a background check after the ex-of-
fender receives a tentative offer of employment.189  If at this
time the applicant’s criminal record is rationally related to the
responsibilities of the position, then the employer could rescind
the applicant’s offer.190  Of course, this is how it should work in
theory.  Criminal records, however, often trigger de facto em-
ployment discrimination by employers, an understandable re-
action given the risks of potential tort liability.191  This makes
the inevitable background check problematic for ex-offenders
because in most states employment is at-will, i.e., an employer
184 JACOBS, supra note 148, at 271.  AUN founded the campaign in 2004 with a R
focus on restrictions to public employment and educating public officials about
the challenges that ex-offenders face and the needs of their communities.  The
movement eventually diversified across different states in the form of statewide
coalitions formed by ex-offenders, elected officials, reentry service providers, civil
rights partners, and legal aid organizations.  See About: The Ban the Box Cam-
paign, BANTHEBOXCAMPAIGN.ORG, http://bantheboxcampaign.org/?p=20#.VqAA
PhgrKuU [https://perma.cc/CD8U-CUFA], for more information about the Ban
the Box Campaign, its history, and the group, All of Us or None.
185 JACOBS, supra note 148, at 271. R
186 Id. at 272.
187 Hawaii was the first state to implement this policy in 1998; the other states
are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Rhode Island. Id.
188 Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Beth Avery, Ban the Box: U.S. Cities, Coun-
ties, and States Adopt Fair Hiring Policies, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Oct. 1, 2016),
http://www.nelp.org/publication/ban-the-box-fair-chance-hiring-state-and-lo
cal-guide/ [https://perma.cc/8UDG-P7LE].  Additionally, a total of twenty-five
cities and counties—including San Francisco, Baltimore, Buffalo, Chicago, New
York City, and the District of Columbia—have adopted these Ban the Box policies.
Id.
189 JACOBS, supra note 148, at 271–72. R
190 See id.
191 Id. at 277.
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may discharge an employee at any time and for any reason.192
To complicate matters further, applicants often receive less
protection than employees from the actions of an employer.193
Hence, ex-offender job applicants with a contingent offer may
still find themselves in a difficult situation upon reentry, even
with the added layer of protection from Ban the Box.194
Cue the narrowly tailored civil disabilities framework.  In
an attempt to further solidify Ban the Box’s underlying policies,
state lawmakers should implement what would be a selective
background check process in both the public and private sec-
tor.  If the applicant’s criminal history is relevant to the job’s
responsibilities, the criminal history will come up in the back-
ground check; conversely, if the criminal history bears no func-
tional or direct relationship to the job’s responsibilities, then
that criminal history information would be suppressed.  For
example, if an applicant has a drug possession conviction and
is applying to be an accountant, the criminal history is not
functionally or directly related to the job’s responsibilities.
Therefore, that criminal history would not show up in the back-
ground check.  On the other hand, if the applicant has a sexual
offense conviction and is applying to be a teacher or work with
children, then the criminal history is directly, functionally, and
rationally relevant to the job’s responsibilities.  In turn, that
criminal history would appear in the background check.
These are of course the easy cases.  It therefore is critical to
consider the many other challenging and unclear cases that
192 The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLA-
TURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employ
ment-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/6TJU-C3DC].  Certain Ban the Box stat-
utes call for the use of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC)
individualized assessment standards, which discourage sweeping exclusions of
applicants solely based on criminal convictions.  Although this does serve as one
way to combat the challenges that a background check may present, the EEOC’s
guidelines are merely policy recommendations and are not necessarily heeded by
courts in cases of challenges to adverse employment decisions. See Johnathan J.
Smith, Banning the Box but Keeping the Discrimination?: Disparate Impact and
Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 197, 220–21 (2014); Roy Maurer, SHRM Seeks Clarification on EEOC’s Crimi-
nal Background Check Guidance, SOC’Y HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Dec. 13, 2012),
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-news/pages/shrm-eeoc-criminal-
background-check.aspx [https://perma.cc/8JL8-ANCX].
193 See, e.g., Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1222 (Cal. 1997) (con-
cluding that job applicants receive fewer protections from suspicionless drug tests
than current employees).
194 Some states do expressly restrict how employers may use information ob-
tained in a background check.  For example, New York utilizes a narrowly tailored
civil disability law to deal with discrimination of ex-offenders by employers. See
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2014).
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can emerge when applying this framework.195  Selective back-
ground checks have the potential to advance key rehabilitative
goals, but state lawmakers should nonetheless proceed with
deliberate caution.  I would recommend the following ap-
proach: First, lawmakers should assess the effectiveness of the
Ban the Box movement—it may be the case that a selective
background check is an unnecessary endeavor if in practice
the prior but unrelated conviction is not improperly biasing the
employment decision.  Second, lawmakers should at first only
apply the selective background check to non-violent offenses.
If the criminal history includes, for example, convictions like
murder, rape, or aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,
then those convictions would always appear in a background
check.  Third, lawmakers should carefully research the effects
of these policies: Do they work in practice and are they accom-
plishing the intended goals of Ban the Box?  Fourth, state
lawmakers should apply additional considerations prior to im-
plementation.  These include the extent of the ex-offender’s
criminal history, the number of years since conviction, any
noted mental history conditions, and critical public policy
considerations.196
Despite this need for great care, the potential benefits are
great.  If this framework works in practice, lawmakers will have
an opportunity to further expand the rehabilitative goals of Ban
the Box, reduce the rates of recidivism amongst these ex-of-
fenders, and demonstrate that ex-offenders can be successfully
reintegrated without endangering their communities.197  Hope-
fully this Note will start the conversation.
CONCLUSION
The hurdles of reentry and reintegration that ex-offenders
face are profound and crippling.  Given the current structure of
the criminal justice system, ex-offenders forever carry onerous
social stigmas, experience heavy financial burdens, and strug-
gle to adapt in a society that refuses to truly welcome them
back.  The historical conceptualization of civil disabilities has
entrenched them in a place of obscurity without much regard
to the overarching effects that these disabilities have on ex-
offenders.198  Yet throughout history, there has been mounting
195 See JACOBS, supra note 148, at 273–74. R
196 Of course, many other considerations exist that need to be explored.  These
merely scratch the surface.
197 See JACOBS, supra note 148, at 272–73. R
198 See Pinard, supra note 19, at 1219–20. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-2\CRN205.txt unknown Seq: 33 17-JAN-17 13:03
2017] LET’S KEEP IT CIVIL 545
displeasure regarding a sweeping imposition of civil disabili-
ties.199  When viewing the current statistics on both incarcera-
tion and recidivism rates, as well as the lingering social
ostracization that ex-offenders face, it is clear that now is the
time for that long-desired change.
To facilitate such a change, narrow tailoring is the answer.
Narrow tailoring will help to properly combat the adverse ef-
fects of civil disabilities and establish a more stringent regula-
tion of a historically overlooked area in criminal sentencing and
procedure.  Further, it will provide clear standards for legisla-
tors to follow when promulgating statutes.  With fewer barriers
impeding successful reentry, the state has an opportunity to
play an active role in the ex-offender’s reentry process.  By
implementing the proposed policy recommendations, states
can move one step closer to realizing this goal.
Given the staggering rates of recidivism in this country,
this solution seems necessary to achieve both the state and
federal governments’ goals of lower crime and recidivism rates.
By limiting civil disabilities to their most necessary applica-
tions, governments will witness tremendous reductions in re-
cidivism rates.  Moreover, such initiatives will drastically
impact the world of the ex-offender.  With the prospects of in-
creased access to employment, education, and public housing,
the formerly stigmatized offenders will have an opportunity to
successfully rehabilitate and re-enter.  Finally, they can have a
fair opportunity to thrive as members of their community.
199 See Love, supra note 30, at 1713–14. R
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